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Abstract
We introduce a framework for studying the effect of cooperation on the quality of outcomes
in utility games. Our framework is a coalitional analog of the smoothness framework of non-
cooperative games. Coalitional smoothness implies bounds on the strong price of anarchy, the
loss of quality of coalitionally stable outcomes, as well as bounds on coalitional versions of coarse
correlated equilibria and sink equilibria, which we define as out-of-equilibrium myopic behavior
as determined by a natural coalitional version of best-response dynamics.
Our coalitional smoothness framework captures existing results bounding the strong price of
anarchy of network design games. We show that in any monotone utility-maximization game, if
each player’s utility is at least his marginal contribution to the welfare, then the strong price of
anarchy is at most 2. This captures a broad class of games, including games with a very high
price of anarchy. Additionally, we show that in potential games the strong price of anarchy is
close to the price of stability, the quality of the best Nash equilibrium.
1 Introduction
We introduce a framework for studying the effect of cooperation on the quality of outcomes in
games. In the past decade we have developed a good understanding about the degradation in social
welfare in games due to selfish play, quantified by the price of anarchy. There are tight bounds
known for the price of anarchy in a range of games from routing, through network design, to various
scheduling games. Much less is understood about outcomes of games where players may cooperate.
However, in many settings players do cooperate, and in many games cooperation can help
improve the outcome. The worst possible Nash equilibrium is a very pessimistic prediction of the
outcome in games that are not strictly competitive, and where cooperation may improve the utility
for all participants. A key issue in understanding cooperative outcomes is to what extend the
players can transfer utility among each-other. Maybe the two dominant notions of cooperative
outcomes that have been considered in the literature are the strong Nash equilibrium of Aumann
[5] assuming no utility transfer between players, and the transferable game notion of the core (see
[12] for a survey). An outcome is a strong Nash equilibrium if it is stable subject to coalitional
deviations, meaning that no group of players can jointly deviate to improve the solution for every
member of the coalition. Allowing utility transfers between the players, leads to a more demanding
form of equilibrium, a solution is unstable in this sense, if there is a possible joint deviation for a
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group that improves the total utility of a group, even if this is not improving the utility of every
single player.
The strong price of anarchy was introduced by Andelman et al [2] and measures the quality
degradation of strong Nash equilibria in games. One of the most compelling examples is the cost-
sharing games. Anshelevich at al [3] showed that the price of anarchy in this class of games with
n players can be as bad as n, but showed a tight Hn = O(log n) bound on the price of stability,
the quality loss in the best Nash equilibria compared to the socially optimal solution. While the
worst Nash equilibria seems too pessimistic a prediction for the outcome, the best Nash equilibria
is potentially too optimistic: while significant cooperation is needed to identify and reach this
solution, the stability concept used is that of Nash equilibria, assuming that only individual players
can deviate, and not groups. Epstein et al [7] showed an Hn bound on the the strong price of
anarchy, matching the price of stability bound.
The strong Nash equilibria (and the strong price of anarchy) is a compelling outcome prediction
in games when strong equilibria exist. However, strong Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to exist,
and do not exist in even small and simple cost-sharing games [7]. Under the transferable utility
definition of coalitional stability, a stable outcome is even less likely to exist. Such stable outcome
is automatically socially optimal (or else the group of all players can deviate), requiring at least the
price of stability to be 1. In fact, already Nash equilibria as a prediction of a game outcome has
issues. While Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, they may not be unique, and natural “game
play” tends not to converge to Nash equilibria; rather, repeated best response style deviations tend
to lead to cycling between outcomes. Hence, it is important to understand the efficiency of games
without reaching stable outcomes. We need to find approaches to quantifying the efficiency of
coalitionally stable equilibrium outcomes in a manner that they would directly extend with very
small degradation even to out-of-equilibrium cooperative dynamic solution concepts.
Roughgarden [15] introduced a framework, called smooth games, encompassing most price of
anarchy bounds, and showing that bounds proved by his smoothness framework automatically
extend also to coarse correlated equilibria, which are outcomes of no-regret learning by each player
[6]. Extending the price of anarchy results to no-regret outcomes is appealing as it is a natural
model of player behavior, and no-regret can be achieved via simple strategies.
The goal of our paper is to initiate a similar study of outcomes of dynamic cooperative play.
We propose a smoothness framework that captures efficiency in most well-established cooperative
equilibrium solution concepts such as the strong Nash equilibrium and randomized versions of it,
and the efficiency guarantees that it implies directly extend with small loss to a form of out-of-
equilibrium cooperative dynamics. The solution concepts of Nash equilibria and as well as the
learning outcome of coarse correlated equilibrium, is based on the assumption that every player
acts independently, in a solely self-interested fashion. We study outcomes of a form of cooperative
play, and our goal is to offer conclusions about the efficiency loss of cooperative play that hold even
without reaching an equilibrium, including games that don’t have strong Nash equilibria.
Our Results. We propose a general framework for quantifying the quality of strong Nash equi-
libria by introducing the notion of coalitional smoothness. We show how coalitional smoothness
captures existing results on network design games, we give new results on the strong price of anarchy
in utility games, and show that coalitional smoothness in such games implies high social welfare at
coalitional sink equilibria, which we define as the out-of-equilibrium myopic behavior as defined by
a natural coalitional version of best-response dynamics.
• We define the notion of a (λ, µ)-coalitionally smooth games and show that the strong price of
anarchy of a (λ, µ)-coalitionally smooth game is bounded by λ/(1 + µ) in utility games and
1
λ/(1 − µ) in cost minimization games.
• We show that the cost-charing games of [7] as well as network contribution games [4] studied
in the literature are coalitionally smooth.
• We show that in any monotone utility-maximization game, if each player’s utility is at least his
marginal contribution to the welfare then the strong price of anarchy is at most 2, while the
price of anarchy in this class of games can be as high as n. This result complements the results
of Vetta and Goemans et al. [21, 8] who studied the price of anarchy of utility-maximization
games that have submodular social welfare function.
• In potential games, such as the cost-sharing game of [7], the potential minimizer is a Nash
equilibrium of high quality. This equilibrium is typically used to bound the price of stability by
showing that the social welfare function is similar to the potential function, namely λ·SW (s) ≤
Φ(s) ≤ µ · SW (s), implying a bound of λ/µ on the price of anarchy. We show that in utility
games this condition also implies that the game is (λ, µ)-coalitionally smooth implying a
λ/(1 + µ) bound on the strong price of anarchy, and give conditions for a similar bound in
cost-minimization potential games extending the work of [7].
• Strong price of anarchy bounds via coalitional smoothness also extend to the notions of strong
correlated equilibria of Moreno and Wooders [13] and strong coarse correlated equilibria of
Rozenfeld et al. [18], which correspond to randomized outcomes where no group of players
C has a joint distribution of strategies D˜C that each member of the group has regret for.
Though there exist games with no strong Nash, that admit such randomized strong equilibria,
unfortunately, there is no simple game play that guarantees this coalitional no-regret property,
and in fact, strong coarse correlated equilibrium may not exist in some games.
• We define a natural coalitional best response dynamic and the corresponding coalitional sink
equilibria, the analog of the notion of sink equilibria introduced by Goemans et al. [8] for
coalitional dynamics. While sink equilibria correspond to steady state behavior of the Markov
chain defined by iteratively doing random unilateral best respond dynamics, coalitional sink
equilibria are the steady state under our coalitional best response dynamic. We do not explic-
itly model how players chose to transfer utility to each other. However, our dynamic assumes
that when a group cooperates, then they can also transfer utility, and hence will choose to
optimize the total utility of all group members. We show that in (λ, µ)-coalitionally smooth
utility games the social welfare of any coalitional sink equilibrium is at least a 1
Hn
λ
1+µ fraction
of the optimal; extending our analysis of outcomes of coalitional play to games when strong
Nash equilibria does not exist.
Related Work
The study of efficiency of worst-case Nash equilibria via the price of anarchy was initiated by
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [11], and has triggered a large body of work. Roughgarden [15]
introduced a canonical way of analyzing the price of anarchy by proposing the notion of a (λ, µ)-
smooth game and showing that most efficiency proofs can be cast as showing that the game is
smooth. Most importantly, [15] showed that any efficiency proven via smoothness arguments di-
rectly extends to outcomes of no-regret learning behavior. Recently, similar frameworks have been
proposed for games of incomplete information [16, 19, 20] and games with continuous strategy spaces
[17]. However, these frameworks do not take into account coalitional robustness and no canonical
way of showing efficiency bounds for coalitional solution concepts existed prior to our work.
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The most well-established coalitionally robust solution concept is that of the strong Nash equi-
librium introduced by Aumann et al. [5]. The study of the efficiency of the worst strong Nash
equilibrium (strong price of anarchy) was introduced in [2], and follow-up research mostly focused
on specific cost minimization games such as network design games [3, 1, 7]. Our coalitional smooth-
ness framework captures some of the results in this literature and gives a generic condition under
which the strong price of anarchy is bounded.
For utility maximization games Vetta [21] defined the class of valid-utility games, which are
utility maximization games with a monotone and submodular welfare function and where each
player’s utility is at least his marginal contribution to the welfare. Vetta [21] showed that every
Nash equilibrium of a valid utility game achieves at least half of the optimal welfare. Later these
games were analyzed from the perspective of best response dynamics by Goemans et al. [8], who
introduced the notion of a sink equilibrium (i.e. steady state distribution of the Markov chain
defined by best-response dynamics) and showed that for a subclass of valid-utility games the half
approximation is achieved after polynomially many rounds, while for the general class, the sink
equilibria can have an efficiency that degrades linearly with the number of players. In this paper, we
show that even without the assumption of submodularity every monotone utility maximization game
that satisfies the marginal contribution condition has good strong price of anarchy. Additionally,
we define a coalitional version of sink equilibria of Goemans et al. [8] and show that for any
coalitionally smooth game the efficiency at these out-of-equilibrium dynamics is only a logarithmic
in the number of players degradation of the implied strong price of anarchy bound.
The efficiency of coalitionally robust soluction concepts in the context of utility-maximization
games was also studied by Anshelevich et al [4] for a class of contribution games in networks,
where pairwise-stable outcomes where analyzed. Most of our theorems imply social welfare bounds
for strong Nash equilibria of network contribution games, that hold under much more general
assumptions than the ones considered in [4].
The existence of strong Nash equilibria was examined by both game theorists and computer
scientists (see e.g. [14, 9, 7]). Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz [18] show that in singleton congestion
games with increasing resource value functions there always exists a strong Nash equilibrium, while
Holzman et al. [10] show that for decreasing function the set of pure Nash equilibria, which is
non-empty, coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria.
2 Coalitional Smoothness
In this section we introduce the notion of coalitional smoothness and show that it captures the
essence of efficiency guarantees of strong Nash equilibria in several games studied in the past, such
as network cost sharing games [3, 7] as well as in new classes of games that we give, which generalize
the well-studied valid-utility games of Vetta [21] to general utility maximization games dropping
the assumption of submodularity.
For ease of presentation we will present the definition of coalitional smoothness for utility max-
imization games rather than cost minimization, but the definitions naturally extend to analogous
ones for cost minimization. We will consider a standard normal form game among n players. Each
player i has a strategy space Si and a utility ui : S1× . . .×Sn → R+. For a subset of players C ⊆ [n]
we will denote with SC = (Si)i∈C the joint strategy space, with sC ∈ SC a joint strategy profile and
with ∆(SC) the space of distributions over strategy profiles. We are interested in quantifying the
efficiency of coalitional solution concepts with respect to the social welfare, which is defined as the
sum of all player utilities: SW (s) =
∑
i∈[n] ui(s). For convenience, we will denote with OPT the
maximal social welfare (resp. minimum social cost) achieved among all possible strategy profiles
and we will try to upper bound the price of anarchy, which is the ratio of the optimal social welfare
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over the social welfare at any equilibrium in the class of solution concepts that we study (e.g. strong
price of anarchy for the case of strong Nash equilibria), or equivalently to lower bound the fraction
of the optimal welfare that every equilibrium in the class achieves.
The intuition behind coalitional smoothness is that it requires from the game to admit a good
strategy profile such that if enough players coalitionally deviate to this strategy from any state with
low social welfare then they achieve a good fraction of the optimal social welfare. In mechanisms
this condition can be alternately phrased as requiring that the group of players can achieve a
good fraction of the optimal social welfare by not paying much more than the current prices [20].
Specifically, it imposes that if we order the players arbitrarily and consider only the coalitional
deviations of all the suffixes of this order then the total utilities of the first player in each of the
suffixes, after the coalitional deviation of the suffix, is at least a λ fraction of the optimal social
welfare or else µ times the current social welfare is at least a λ fraction of the optimal.
Definition 1 (Coalitional Smoothness) A utility maximization game is (λ, µ)-coalitionally smooth
if there exists a strategy profile s∗ such that for any strategy profile s and for any permutation π of
the players:
n∑
i=1
ui(s
∗
Npi(i)
, s−Npi(i)) ≥ λ ·OPT− µ · SW (s) (1)
where Nπ(i) = {j ∈ [n] : π(j) ≥ π(i)} is the set of all players preceding i in the permutation and
(sNt , s−Nt) is the strategy profile where all players in i ∈ Nt play s
∗
i and all other players play s.
1
We now formally define the notion of a strong Nash equilibrium introduced by Aumann [5] and
show that coalitional smoothness implies high efficiency at every strong Nash equilibrium of a game.
Definition 2 (Strong Nash Equilibrium) A strategy profile s is a strong Nash equilibrium if
for any coalition C ⊆ [n] and for any coalitional strategy sC ∈ SC , there exists a player i ∈ C such
that: ui(s) ≥ ui(sC , s−C).
Theorem 3 If a game is (λ, µ)-coalitionally smooth for some λ, µ ≥ 0 then every strong Nash
equilibrium has social welfare at least λ1+µ of the optimal.
2
Proof. Let s be strong Nash equilibrium strategy profile and let s∗ be the optimal strategy profile.
If all players coalitionally deviate to s∗ then, by the definition of a strong Nash equilibrium, there is
a player i who is blocking the deviation, i.e. ui(s) ≥ ui(s
∗). Without loss of generality, reorder the
players such that this is player 1. Similarly, if players {2, . . . , n} deviate to playing their strategy in
x∗ then there exists some player, obviously different than 1 who is blocking the deviation. Without
loss of generality, by reordering we can assume that this player is 2. Using similar reasoning we can
reorder the players such that if players {i, . . . , n} deviate to their strategy in the optimal strategy
profile x∗ then player i is the one blocking the deviation. That is player i’s utility at the strong Nash
equilibrium is at least his utility in the deviating strategy profile. Thus under this order ∀k ∈ N :
ui(x) ≥ ui(s
∗
Nk
, s−Nk). Summing over all players and using the coalitional smoothness property for
the above order we get the result:
SW (s) =
∑N
i=1 ui(s) ≥
∑N
i=1 ui(s
∗
Ni
, s−Ni) ≥ λSW (s
∗)− µSW (s)
1In the case of cost minimization games we would require:
∑n
i=1 ci(s
∗
Npi(i)
, s−Npi(i) ) ≤ λ · SC(s
∗) + µ · SC(s)
2In cost-minimization games (λ, µ)-coalitional smoothness for λ ≥ 0 and µ ≤ 1 would imply that the social cost
at every strong Nash equilibrium is at most λ
1−µ
of the minimum cost.
4
Similar to smoothness, coalitional smoothness also implies efficiency bounds even for random-
ized coalition-proof solution concepts. Adapting randomized solution concepts such as correlated
equilibria so as to make them robust to coalitional deviations is not as straightforward as in the
case of unilateral stability. This is mainly due to information considerations. One well-studied such
concept is that of strong correlated equilibria of Moreno and Wooders [13].
Definition 4 (Strong Correlated Equilibrium) A distribution D ∈ ∆(S) over strategy profiles
is a strong correlated equilibrium, if for any coalition C ⊆ [n] and for any mapping D˜C : SC →
∆(SC) there exist a player i ∈ C such that:
Es∼D[ui(s)] ≥ Es∼DEs˜C∼D˜C(sC)[ui(s˜C , s−C)] (2)
This notion assumes that coalitions form at the ex-ante stage, before players receive their recom-
mendations of which strategy to play. The deviation is a conditional plan on which distribution
players will deviate too, conditional on the recommendation that they get. Thus implicitly it is
assumed that if players commit to a coalition ex-ante, then after receiving their recommendations
on which strategy to play, they share it publicly among the players in the coalition and decide on
a joint deviation. A strong correlated equilibrium asks that for any coalition and for any deviating
plan there exists some player in the coalition that doesn’t benefit from the deviation. Using the
same approach as in Theorem 3 and the fact that the deviating strategy designated by the coali-
tional smoothness property is independent of the same for any strategy profile we get the same
efficiency guarantee for strong correlated equilibria too. Unlike Correlated Equilibria, Strong Cor-
related Equilibria don’t always exist even in cost-sharing games, as seen by the example of Epstein
at al [?] modeling the prisoner’s dilemma as a cost-sharing game. However, there are games that
admit no Strong Nash Equilibrium but have a Strong Correlated Equilibrium (see e.g. Moreno and
Wooders [13] for such an example of a three-player matching pennies game).
Similarly, one can define the coalitional equivalent of coarse correlated equilibria, which was
analyzed by Rozenfeld et al. [18], under which the coalitional deviation cannot depend on the
recommended actions of the players, but is a fixed coalitional strategy.
Definition 5 (Strong Coarse Correlated Equilibrium) A distribution D ∈ ∆(S) over strat-
egy profiles is a strong coarse correlated equilibrium, if for any coalition C ⊆ [n] and for any
distribution D˜C ∈ ∆(SC) there exist a player i ∈ C such that:
Es∼D[ui(s)] ≥ Es∼D,s˜C∼D˜C [ui(s˜C , s−C)] (3)
Theorem 6 If a utility game is (λ, µ)-coalitionally smooth then every strong coarse correlated equi-
librium has expected social welfare at least λ1+µ of the optimal.
3
Strong coarse correlated equilibria are not a strict subset of strong Nash equilibria as defined above,
since the deviating constraints that strong correlated equilibria need to satisfy are a superset of
those of strong Nash equilibria. However, strong coarse correlated equilibria allow for distributions
over strategy profiles. We could make strong coarse correlated equilibria a subset if we slightly
modified the deviation constraints to only pure deviations. Coalitional smoothness would imply
bounds for this larger set of equilibria too.
3In a cost minimization game is (λ, µ)-coalitionally smooth then every strong coarse correlated equilibrium has
expected cost at most λ
1−µ
of the optimal.
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Strong coarse correlated equilibria are related to no-regret repeated game playing: they cor-
respond to limit sequences of game playing under which no coalition regrets not having formed a
coalition C and deviating coalitionally to some fixed strategy sC (in the sense of every player in
the coalition being better off). However, unlike coarse correlated equilibria (e.g. hedge algorithm),
there are no known methods that achieve such coalitional stability in the limit. In fact, there can-
not be such algorithms for arbitrary games, since there are games that don’t admit strong coarse
correlated equilibria, such as the prisoner’s dilemma. This observation highlights the study of other
types of cyclic dynamics that would lead to good welfare in the limit even without reaching some
equilibrium notion and which would be valid for any game. In Section 4 we give the first such out-
of-equilibrium efficiency guarantees that take into account coalitional deviations, by introducing a
natural version of myopic coalitional best-response dynamics.
2.1 Non-Submodular Monotone Utility Games
Consider a utility maximization game in which every player has an souti strategy, corresponding to
the player not entering the game. Further assume that the game is monotone with respect to partic-
ipation, i.e. no player can decrease the social welfare by entering the game: ∀i ∈ [n],∀s : SW (s) ≥
SW (souti , s−i). We show that the coalitional smoothness of such a game is captured exactly by the
proportion of the marginal contribution to the social welfare that a player is guaranteed to get as
utility.
Theorem 7 Any monotone utility maximization game is guaranteed to be (γ, γ)-coalitionally smooth,
if each player is guaranteed at least a γ fraction of his marginal contribution to the social welfare:
∀s : ui(s) ≥ γ
(
SW (s)− SW (souti , s−i)
)
(4)
Proof. Consider an arbitrary order of the players and let s∗ be the strategy profile that maximizes
the social welfare. By the marginal contribution property we have:
∑n
i=1 ui(s
∗
Ni
, s−Ni) ≥ γ ·
∑n
i=1
(
SW
(
s∗Ni , s−Ni
)
− SW
(
souti , sN∗i+1 , s−Ni
))
In addition, by the monotonicity assumption the social welfare can only increase when a player
enters the game with any strategy:
SW (souti , s
∗
Ni+1
, s−Ni) ≤ SW (sk, s
∗
Ni+1
, s−Ni) = SW (s
∗
Ni+1
, s−Ni+1)
Combining the above inequalities we get a telescoping sum that yields the desired property:
∑n
i=1 ui(s
∗
Ni
, s−Ni) ≥ γ ·
∑n
i=1
(
SW (s∗Ni , s−Ni)− SW (sN
∗
i+1
, s−Ni+1)
)
≥ γ · SW (s∗)− γ · SW (s) = γ ·OPT− γ · SW (s)
Which is exactly the (γ, γ)-coalitional smoothness property we wanted.
This latter result complements Vetta’s results on valid-utility games. A valid-utility game
is a monotone utility-maximization game with the extra constraint that the social welfare is a
submodular function (if viewed as a set function on strategies). As presented by Roughgarden [15],
Vetta showed that in any monotone utility-maximization game with a submodular welfare function,
if each player receives a γ fraction of their marginal contribution to the welfare, then the game is
(γ, γ)-smooth implying that every Nash equilibrium achieves a γ
γ+1 fraction of the optimal welfare.
In the absence of submodularity there are easy examples where the worst Nash equilibrium doesn’t
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achieve any constant fraction of the optimal welfare, despite satisfying the marginal contribution
condition. However, our result shows that even in the absence of submodularity every such game
will be (γ, γ)-coalitionally smooth, implying that every strong Nash equilibrium will achieve a γ
γ+1
fraction of the welfare.
It is important to note that the approximate marginal contribution condition and the submod-
ularity condition are very orthogonal ones. For instance, it is possible that a game satisfies the
approximate marginal contribution condition for some constant, but is not submodular or even
approximately submodular under existing definitions of approximate submodularity. In Appendix
A, we give a class of welfare sharing games, where our efficiency theorem applies to give constant
bounds on the string price of anarchy, whilst the price of anarchy is unbounded due to the non-
submodularity of the social welfare.
2.2 Network Cost-Sharing Games.
In this section we analyze the well-studied class of cost sharing games [3], using the coalitional
smoothness property. The game is defined by a set of resources R each associated with a cost cr.
Each player’s strategy space Si is a set of subsets of R. The cost of each resource is shared equally
among all players that use the resource and a players total cost is the sum of his cost-shares on
the resources that he uses. If we denote with nr(s) the number of players using resource r under
strategy profile s, then: ci(s) =
∑
r∈si
cr
nr(s)
.
Epstein et al [7] showed that every strong Nash equilibrium of the above class of games has social
cost at most Hn times the optimal, where Hn is the n-th harmonic number. Here we re-interpret
that result as showing that network cost-sharing games are (Hn, 0)-coalitionally smooth. In the
next section we show that the analysis of [7] can be applied to a more broad class of potential
games, showing a strong connection between the price of stability and the string price of anarchy.
Theorem 8 (Epstein et al.[7]) Cost sharing games are (Hn, 0)-coalitionally smooth. (App. B).
3 Best Nash Equilibrium vs. Worst Strong Nash Equilibrium
strong Nash equilibria are a subset of Nash equilibria, so in games when strong Nash equilibria
exists, the strong price of anarchy cannot be better than the price of stability (the quality of best
Nash). In this section we show that in potential games these two notions are surprisingly close.
We show that through the lens of coalitional smoothness there is a strong connection between the
analysis of the efficiency of the worst strong Nash equilibria and the dominant analysis of the best
Nash equilibria, for the class of potential games. A game admits a potential function if there exists
a common function Φ(s) for all players, such that a player’s difference in utility from a unilateral
deviation is equal to difference in the potential:
ui(s
′
i, s−i)− ui(s) = Φ(s
′
i, s−i)− Φ(s) (5)
A large amount of recent work in the algorithmic game theory literature has focused on the
analysis of the efficiency of the best Nash equilibrium (price of stability). For the case of potential
games the dominant way of analysing the price of stability is the Potential Method: suppose that
the potential function is (λ, µ)-close to the social welfare, in the sense that
λ · SW (s) ≤ Φ(s) ≤ µ · SW (s), (6)
for some parameters λ, µ ≥ 0. Then the best Nash equilibrium achieves at least λ
µ
of the optimal
social welfare. The proof relies on the simple fact that the potential maximizer is always a Nash
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equilibrium and by the (λ, µ) property it’s easy to see that the potential maximizer has social
welfare that is the above fraction of the optimal social welfare.
The following theorems show that for such potential games the price of stability is very close
to the strong price of anarchy, i.e. the implied quality of the best Nash equilibrium is close to the
quality of the worst strong Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 9 In a utility-maximization potential game with non-negative utilities, if the potential is
(λ, µ)-close to the social welfare then the game is (λ, µ)-coalitionally smooth, implying that every
strong Nash equilibrium achieves at least λ1+µ of the optimal social welfare.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary order of the players and some strategy profile s. By the definition
of the potential function and the fact that utilities are non-negative, we have
ui(s
∗
Ni
, s−Ni) = Φ(s
∗
Ni
, s−Ni)− Φ(s
∗
Ni+1
, s−Ni+1) + ui(s
∗
Ni+1
, s−Ni+1) ≥ Φ(s
∗
Ni
, s−Ni)−Φ(s
∗
Ni+1
, s−Ni+1)
Combining with our assumption on the relation between potential and social welfare we obtain the
coalitional smoothness property:∑
i ui(s
∗
Ni
, s−Ni) ≥
∑
i Φ(s
∗
Ni
, s−Ni)− Φ(s
∗
Ni+1
, s−Ni+1) = Φ(s
∗)− Φ(s) ≥ λ · SW (s∗)− µ · SW (s)
Observe that the (λ, µ)-closeness of the potential function does not imply smoothness of the
game according to the standard definition of smoothness [15] and hence does not imply a price
of anarchy bound. It does so only if the potential is a submodular function and by following a
similar analysis as in the case of valid utility games as we show in Appendix C. Such a property
for instance, holds in any utility congestion game with decreasing resource utilities. However, the
theorem above does not require submodularity of the potential but only requires the weaker notion
of coalitional smoothness to hold.
One example application of the above theorem is in the context of network contribution games
[4]. In a network contribution game each player corresponds to a node in a social network. Each
edge corresponds to a ”friendship” between the connecting nodes or more generally some joint
venture. Each player has a budget of effort that he chooses how to distribute among his friendships.
Each friendship e between two players i and j, has a value ve(xi, xj) that corresponds to the value
produced as a function of the efforts put into it by the two players. This value is equally split
among the two players. It is easy to see that in such a game the social welfare is the total value
produced, while the potential is equal to half of the social welfare. Thus, by applying Theorem 9
we get that for arbitrary ”friendship” value functions ve(·, ·) the game is
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
-coalitionally smooth
and hence every strong Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/3 of the optimal social welfare. In
contrast, observe that in such a game Nash equilibria can have unbounded inefficiency, and the
game is not (λ, µ)-smooth under the unilateral notion of smoothness for no λ, µ. 4
For settings where a player can only have non-negative externalities on the utilities of other
players by entering the game, a much stronger connection can be drawn. More concretely, a utility
maximization game has non-negative externalities if for any strategy profile s and for any pairs of
players i, j: ui(s) ≥ ui(s
out
j , s−j).
5 The souti strategy is not required to be a valid strategy that the
4Consider an example of a line of four nodes (A,B,C,D). Each player has a budget of 1. Edges (A,B) and (C,D)
have a constant value of 1, while edge (B,C) has a huge value H if both players place their whole budget on it and 0
otherwise. Players B,C placing their budget on their alternative friendships is a Nash equilibrium, but not a strong
Nash equilibrium.
5Similarly a cost-minimization game has non-negative externalities if ci(s) ≤ ci(s
out
j , s−j).
8
player can actually pick, but rather a hypothetical strategy, requiring the property that the cost of
the player in that strategy is 0, and the cost functions and the potential are extended appropriately
such that the potential function property is maintained even in this augmented strategy space and
the potential when all players have left the game is 0: Φ(sout) = 0. For instance, every congestion
game has the above property if we define the souti strategy to be the empty set of resources.
Theorem 10 A utility-maximization potential game with only positive externalities and such that
Φ(s) ≥ λ ·SW (s) is (λ, 0)-coalitionally smooth. Similarly, a cost-minimization, potential game with
only positive externalities and such that Φ(s) ≤ λ · SC(s) is (λ, 0)-coalitionally smooth.
In the context of cost-minimization, one well-studied example of such a setting is that of network
cost-sharing games and the log(n) strong price of anarchy result of Epstein et al. [7] is a special
instance of the above theorem. In the context of utility-maximization games one example is that
of network contribution games under the restriction that friendship value functions ve(·, ·) are
increasing in both coordinates. Under this restriction applying Theorem 10 we get the improved
bound that every strong Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/2 of the optimal social welfare.
4 Coalitional Best-Response Dynamics
In this section we initiate the study of out of equilibrium dynamic behavior in games. We show
that if a utility game is (λ, µ)-coalitionally smooth then this implies an efficiency guarantee for
out of equilibrium dynamic behavior in a certain best-response like dynamic. This is particularly
interesting for games that do not admit a strong Nash equilibrium, but where coalitional deviations
are bound to occur. Our approach is similar in spirit to the notion of sink equilibria introduced by
Goemans et al. [8]. sink equilibria correspond to steady state behavior of the Markov chain defined
by iteratively doing random unilateral best respond dynamics. However, such a notion does not
capture settings where players can communicate and at each step perform coalitional deviations.
We introduce a version of coalitional best-response dynamics, that allows for coalitional devia-
tions at each time step, giving more probability to small coalitions. In our dynamic, at each step a
selected group is chosen to to cooperate. We assume that when a group cooperates, then they can
also transfer utility, and hence will choose to optimize the total utility of all group members. Then
we analyze the social welfare of the steady states arising in the long run as we perform coalitional
best response dynamics for a long period. Similar to [8] we will refer to these steady states as
coalitional sink equilibria. Similar to sink equilibria that are a way of studying games whose best
response dynamics might not converge to a pure Nash equilibrium or even games that do not ad-
mit a pure Nash equilibrium, coalitional sink equilibria are an interesting alternative for analyzing
efficiency in games that do not admit a strong Nash equilibrium, which admittedly is even more
rare than the pure Nash equilibrium.
Our coalitional best response dynamics are defined as follows: At each iteration a coalition is
picked at random by a distribution that favors coalitions of smaller size. Specifically, first a coalition
size k is picked inversely proportional to the size and then a coalition of size k is picked uniformly
at random. Subsequently, the picked coalition deviates to the joint strategy profile that maximizes
the total utility of the coalition, conditional on the current strategy of every player outside of the
coalition (a more formal definition is given in Algorithm 1 in the Appendix).
Theorem 11 If a utility maximization game with non-negative utilities is (λ, µ)-coalitionally smooth
then the expected social welfare at every coalitional Sink Equilibrium is at least 1
Hn
λ
1+µ of the optimal.
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Proof. Let st be the strategy profile at some step of the best response dynamics and let s∗ be
the strategy profile designated by the coalitional smoothness property. We examine the expected
welfare of the dynamics after one step. Let Ck be all the possible coalitions of size k.
E[SW (st) | st−1 = s] =
1
Hn
n∑
k=1
1
k
∑
C∈Ck
1(
n
k
)SW (stC , s−C) ≥ 1Hn
n∑
k=1
1
k
∑
C∈Ck
1(
n
k
)∑
i∈C
ui(s
t
C , s−C)
Since the deviation stCt maximizes the total utility of the deviating players, it achieves at least as
much welfare as s∗Ct :
E[SW (st) | st−1 = s] ≥
1
Hn
n∑
k=1
1
k
∑
C∈Ck
1(
n
k
)∑
i∈C
ui(s
∗
C , s−C) =
1
Hn
1
n!
n∑
k=1
∑
C∈Ck
∑
i∈C
(n− k)! · k!
k
ui(s
∗
C , s−C)
=
1
Hn
1
n!
n∑
k=1
∑
C∈Ck
∑
i∈C
(n − k)! · (k − 1)! · ui(s
∗
C , s−C)
=
1
Hn
1
n!
∑
i∈[n]
n∑
k=1
∑
C∈Ck:i∈C
(n− k)! · (k − 1)! · ui(s
∗
C , s−C)
Let Π be the set of permutations of players. We argue that:∑
i∈[n]
∑n
k=1
∑
C∈Ck :i∈C
(n − k)! · (k − 1)! · ui(s
∗
C , s−C) =
∑
π∈Π
∑n
i=1 ui(s
∗
Npi(i)
, s−Npi(i))
Observe that for any player i and for any set of players C ∈ Ck, such that i ∈ C, the term ui(s
∗
C , s
t−1
−C )
appears in the summation on the right hand side, exactly (n− k)! · (k − 1)! times. It appears only
when player i is placed at the k-th last position in the permutation and it appears once for each
possible permutation of the k− 1 players following i and for each possible permutation of the n− k
players preceding i. The latter is exactly (n − k)! · k!. Using the coalitional smoothness property
for each of the permutations we get a lower bound on the welfare at time step t:
E[SW (st) | st−1 = s] ≥
1
Hn
1
n!
∑
π∈Π
n∑
i=1
ui(s
∗
Npi(i)
, s−Npi(i)) ≥
1
Hn
1
n!
∑
π∈Π
(λ ·OPT− µ · SW (s))
=
1
Hn
(λ ·OPT− µ · SW (s))
Let D be a steady state distribution over strategy profiles of the coalitional best response dynamics.
By the definition of the steady state we get:
Es∼DEst[SW (s
t)|st−1 = s] = Est−1[SW (s
t−1)] = Es∼D[SW (s)]
Using this property and our lower bound on the social welfare at time step t conditional on any
possible current state s we get:
Es∼D[SW (s)] = Es∼DEst[SW (s
t)|st−1 = s] ≥
1
Hn
(λ ·OPT− µ · Es∼D[SW (s)])
which yields the claimed lower bound on the expected welfare at the steady state.
The Markov chain defined by the coalitional best-response dynamics might take long time to
converge to a steady state. However, our analysis shows a stronger statement: at any iteration
T if we take the empirical distribution defined by the best-response play up till time T , then the
expected welfare of this empirical distribution is at least ≈ 12
λ
Hn+µ
of the optimal welfare.
Corollary 12 The empirical distribution of play defined by doing random coalitional best responses
for T time steps, achieves expected social welfare at least T−12T
λ
Hn+µ
of the optimal welfare.
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A Welfare Sharing Games without Submodularity
We consider here an interesting example of monotone utility games without the submodularity
assumption needed for the valid-utility games of Vetta et al. [21]. Our efficiency theorem applies
to this class to give constant bounds on the strong price of anarchy, while the price of anarchy is
unbounded due to the non-submodularity of the social welfare.
Our Welfare Sharing Game is defined as follows: The game is defined by a set of projects [m].
Each player i ∈ [n] participates in a set of project Pi ⊆ [m] and has a budget of effort Bi that
he chooses how to split among his projects. Denote with Nj the set of players that participate in
project j ∈ [m] and with xj = (x
i
j)i∈Nj the vector of efforts placed at project j by its participants.
Each project j is associated with a value function vj(xj), that is monotone in every coordinate and
we denote with ∂ivj(xj) = vj(xj) − vj(0
i, x−ij ) the marginal contribution of player i to the value.
The value of each project is split among the participants proportional to the marginal contribution
and the utility of each participant is the sum of his shares:
ui(x) =
∑
j∈Pi
∂iv(xj)∑
k∈Nj
∂kv(xj)
v(xj) (7)
We examine the case where players can be categorized in groups G where each group has a
specific skill. We denote with Gj ⊆ G the subset of skills that contribute to a specific project j.
We assume that the value function of a project satisfies the decreasing marginal contribution
property skill-wise. That is, for any given effort levels x−g of players outside of a given skill group
g ∈ Gj, the group restricted value functions vj(xg, x−g) satisfy the decreasing marginal contribution
property (i.e. the marginal contribution of a player in the group decreases, if we increase the efforts
of other players within the group). For instance, the value could be of the form of a product of
skill-specific functions: vj(xj) =
∏
g∈Gj
vgj (xg), such that each v
g
j (xg) is a function that satisfies the
decreasing marginal property. This way we could capture settings where a positive effort from each
skill is needed to produce any value. If the set of skill groups is a singleton and hence the values
satisfy the decreasing marginal contribution in general, then the game becomes a valid-utility game
according to Vetta [21] and therefore, even Nash equilibria have good social welfare. However, even
if |G| = 2 the efficiency of Nash equilibria can be unboundedly worse than the optimal. On the
contrary we show that strong Nash equilibria always achieve a 1maxj |Gj |+1 fraction of the optimal
welfare.
Lemma 13 The Welfare Sharing Game is ( 1maxj |Gj | ,
1
maxj |Gj |
)-coalitionally smooth.
Proof. By monotonicity of the value functions we know that the game is a monotone utility-
maximization game. Thus we simply need to show that it satisfies the approximate marginal
contribution property with γ = 1|G| and then Theorem 7 will apply to give the result.
To achieve this we simply need to show that
∑
j ∂jvj(xj) ≤ |Gj|vj(xj) since that would imply
that:
ui(x) ≥
1
|Gj |
∑
j∈Pi
∂ivj(xj) (8)
Observe that ∑
j∈M
∂jvj(xj) =
∑
g∈Gj
∑
k∈g
∂kvj(xj)
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Within a skill group the value function satisfies the diminishing marginal contribution property when
effort levels of players outside the skill group are fixed. For a specific skill group g that contributes
to project j consider an arbitrary ordering of the player {1, . . . , ng}. By the diminishing marginal
contribution property: ∀k ∈ g : ∂kvj(xj) ≤ ∂kvj(0, . . . , 0, xk,j , . . . , xng ,j, x
−g
j ). Then summing over
all players in the group we obtain:
∑
k∈g ∂kvj(xj) ≤ vj(xj) − vj(0, . . . , 0, x
−g
j ) ≤ vj(xj). This then
directly implies:
∑
g∈Gj
∑
k∈g ∂kvj(xj) ≤ |Gj |vj(xj) which completes the proof.
B Network Cost-Sharing Games and Coalitional Smoothness
Theorem 14 (Epstein et al.[7]) Cost Sharing Games are (Hn, 0)-coalitionally smooth, where Hn
is the n-th harmonic number.
Proof. To prove our coalitional smoothness property we need to show that for any ordering of
the players:
n∑
i=1
ci(s
∗
Ni
, s−Ni) ≤ Hn · SC(s
∗) (9)
It is easy to observe that the potential Φ(s) remains a potential, even if we augment the strategy
of each player by allowing them to drop out of the game and use no resource, incurring a cost of 0.
Similar to utility maximization games, we will denote such a strategy as souti , though we will not
assume that this strategy is a strategy that is available to the players, but rather will only use it for
the analysis. Using the potential property in this augmented strategy space and since cost shares
are increasing as we remove players we have:
ci(s
∗
Ni
, s−Ni) ≤ ci(s
∗
Ni
, sout−Ni) = Φ(s
∗
Ni
, sout−Ni)− Φ(s
∗
Ni+1
, sout−Ni+1) (10)
Using the above inequality we get a telescoping sum that yields the coalitional smoothness property:
n∑
i=1
ci(s
∗
Ni
, s−Ni) ≤
n∑
i=1
(
Φ(s∗Ni , s
out
−Ni)− Φ(s
∗
Ni+1
, sout−Ni+1)
)
= Φ(s∗)− Φ(sout) = Φ(s∗) ≤ Hn · SC(s
∗)
C Games with Submodular Potential
In this section we present a side-result that potential games with a potential that is (λ, µ)-close
to the social welfare are (λ, µ)-smooth and therefore have a price of anarchy of λ1+µ . Additionally,
they behave similar to basic utility games and for instance, the above price of anarchy bound is
approximately reached even after a polynomial number of random best-response steps.
In this section we will overload notation and talk about social welfare and potential as set
functions defined on sets of strategies. Thus we will write Φ(∪isi) and SW (∪isi) the potential and
the social welfare when each player chooses a strategy si. We will assume that the potential and
the social welfare are also defined for multisets and with ∪ we will denote the multiset union (i.e.
every element is added many times). Under such notation a the potential is submodular if for any
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two multisets of strategies s ⊆ t (where inclusion is the extended inclusion for multisets, i.e. each
element should appear at least as many times in t as in s) and for any strategy si of some player i:
Φ(si ∪ s)− Φ(s) ≥ Φ(si ∪ t)−Φ(t) (11)
We will also assume that each player has an empty strategy and that his utility from this strategy
is 0.
Theorem 15 In any utility-maximization potential game, if the potential is (λ, µ)-close to the
social welfare and is monotone submodular, then the game is (λ, µ)-smooth and therefore every
Nash Equilibrium achieves at least λ1+µ of the optimal social welfare.
Proof. Consider any strategy profile s and let s∗ be the optimal strategy profile. Let s−i denote
the mutliset ∪j 6=isj , sNi = ∪j≥isj and s−Ni = ∪j<isj. By the definition of the potential and the
submodularity we have:∑
i
ui(s
∗
i , s−i) =
∑
i
Φ(s∗i ∪ s−i)−Φ(s−i)
≥
∑
i
Φ(s∗i ∪ s−i ∪ si ∪ s
∗
Ni+1
)−Φ(s−i ∪ si ∪ s
∗
Ni+1
)
≥
∑
i
Φ(s∗Ni ∪ s)−Φ(s
∗
Ni+1
∪ S)
=Φ(s∗ ∪ s)− Φ(s) ≥ Φ(s∗)−Φ(s)
≥λSW (s∗)− µSW (s)
Now we also note that the above bound can be achieved by a polynomial number of best response
dynamics. In a random best response dynamic, at each time step a player is chosen at random and
he performs a best response to the current strategies of the rest of the players.
Theorem 16 Consider a sequence of random-player best response dynamics. Then after n· λ
λ+1 log
(
λ
(λ+1)ǫ
)
steps the social welfare is at least λ
µ
(
λ
λ+1 − ǫ
)
of the optimal.
Proof. Let s˜ be the strategy profile that maximizes the potential and s∗ the strategy profile that
maximizes the social welfare. At each time step a player is chosen at random and he best responds
given the current strategy profile. We denote with st the strategy profile at time step t. After a
step of random best response moves the expected increase in the potential is equal to the expected
change of the players’ utilities:
E
[
Φ(st+1)− Φ(st)
]
=
1
n
∑
i
(
ui(s
t+1
i , s
t
−i)− ui(s
t)
)
=
1
n
∑
i
ui(s
t+1
i , s
t
−i)−
1
n
SW (s)
≥
1
n
∑
i
ui(s˜, s
t
−i)−
1
n
SW (s)
By using similar reasoning as in Theorem 15 we get that
∑
i ui(s˜, s
t
−i) ≥ Φ(s˜)−Φ(s
t). Thus we get:
E
[
Φ(st+1)− Φ(st)
]
≥
1
n
(
Φ(s˜)− Φ(st)− SW (s)
)
≥
1
n
(
Φ(s˜)−
(
1 +
1
λ
)
Φ(st)
)
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Thus the expression Φ(s˜)−
(
1 + 1
λ
)
E[Φ(st)], decreases in expectation by at least
(
1 + 1
λ
)
1
n
(Φ(s˜)−(
1 + 1
λ
)
E[Φ(st)]), after every time step. Thus if s0 is the initial strategy profile, after t time steps
we have:
Φ(s˜)−
(
1 +
1
λ
)
E[Φ(st)] ≤
(
1−
(
1 +
1
λ
)
1
n
)t (
Φ(s˜)− Φ(s0)
)
≤
(
1−
(
1 +
1
λ
)
1
n
)t
Φ(s˜) (12)
By rearranging we get:
E[Φ(st)] ≥
λ
λ+ 1
(
1−
(
1−
(
1 +
1
λ
)
1
n
)t)
Φ(s˜) ≥
λ
λ+ 1
(
1− e−
λ+1
λ
t
n
)
Φ(s˜) (13)
By (λ, µ)-closeness we get:
E[SW (st)] ≥
1
µ
E[Φ(st)] ≥
1
µ
λ
λ+ 1
(
1− e−
λ+1
λ
t
n
)
Φ(s˜)
≥
1
µ
λ
λ+ 1
(
1− e−
λ+1
λ
t
n
)
Φ(s∗)
≥
λ
µ
λ
λ+ 1
(
1− e−
λ+1
λ
t
n
)
SW (s∗)
By setting the declared bound on t we get the theorem.
A basic utility game as defined by Vetta [21] is a special case of the above theorem, where
λ = µ = 1, i.e. where the potential is equal to the social welfare. We describe below another class
of such games.
A utility congestion game consists of a set of players and a set of resources R. Each players
strategy space consists of subsets of the resources. Each resource r is associated with a utility
function πr that depends only on the number of players nr using the resource. The utility of each
player is the sum of his utilities from each resource in his strategy. A utility congestion game is
known to admit Rosenthal’s potential: Φ(s) =
∑
r
∑nr(s)
k=1 πr(k). Moreover, the social welfare ends
up being SW (s) =
∑
r nr(s)πr(nr(s)). It is easy to see that if πr are decreasing functions then
Φ(s) ≥ SW (s). Thus, if we prove submodularity of the potential and we can bound from above the
potential by Φ(s) ≤ µSW (s) then the game will be (1, µ)-smooth.
Theorem 17 The potential of any utility congestion game with non-negative decreasing utilities is
monotone submodular.
Proof. We will view the potential function as a function on multisets, where a player playing
more than one strategies means adding to the resources the extra congestion that these strategies
imply. Thus, we can think of congestion nr(s) as a set function that counts how many strategies in
the set of strategies s use the resource r (double counting if a strategy is more than one times in
s). Let s, t be two multisets of strategies, Let s ∪ t be the multiset sum of S and T . Then:
Φ(s ∪ t) =
∑
r∈R
nr(s∪t)∑
t=1
πr(t) ≥
∑
r∈R
nr(s)∑
t=1
πr(t) = Φ(s)
Thus Φ(s) satisfies monotonicity. Moreover, let s ⊆ t and let si be some strategy of some player.
By s ⊆ t we have ∀r ∈ R : nr(s) ≤ nr(t). Also it holds that ∀r : nr(si ∪ s) = nr(si) + nr(s). Then
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ALGORITHM 1: Coalitional Best-Response Dynamics
1 Let st be the strategy profile at iteration t. Initialize s0 to some arbitrary strategy.
2 for each iteration t do
3 Pick a coalitional size k ∈ {1, . . . , n} inversely proportional to k.
4 Pick a coalition Ct ⊆ [n] of size k uniformly at random from all possible coalitions.
5 Let st
Ct
= argmaxsCt
∑
i∈Ct
ui(sCt , s
t−1
−Ct
) be the joint strategy profile of players in Ct that maximizes
their total utility, conditional on what the rest of the players are playing.
6 All players in Ct deviate to their strategy in the above optimal. Update s
t = (st
Ct
, st−1
−Ct
).
end
using the decreasing property of πr(t):
Φ(si ∪ s)− Φ(s) =
∑
r∈R
nr(si∪s)∑
t=nr(s)+1
πr(t) =
∑
r∈R
nr(s)+nr(si)∑
t=nr(s)+1
πr(t)
≥
∑
r∈R
nr(t)+nr(si)∑
t=nr(t)+1
πr(t) = Φ(si ∪ t)− Φ(t)
(14)
Thus Φ(s) satisfies submodularity.
For instance, when πr(k) =
vr
k
then we get that Φ(s) ≤ HnSW (s). Thus such games are (1,Hn)-
smooth and even more interestingly, by applying Theorem 16 we get that after n · log
(
1
2ǫ
)
rounds
of random best-response dynamics the social welfare will be at least 12·Hn of the optimal.
D Ommited Proofs
Proof of Theorem 10: We will give the proof for the case of utility-maximization games.
Consider an arbitrary order of the players and some strategy profile s. By the positive externality
condition and the definition of the potential function, we have
ui(s
∗
Ni
, s−Ni) ≥ ui(s
∗
Ni
, sout−Ni) = Φ(s
∗
Ni
, sout−Ni)− Φ(s
∗
Ni+1
, sout−Ni+1)
Combining with the assumption on the relation between potential and social welfare we obtain the
coalitional smoothness property:∑
i
ui(s
∗
Ni
, s−Ni) ≥
∑
i
Φ(s∗Ni , s
out
−Ni)− Φ(s
∗
Ni+1
, sout−Ni+1) = Φ(s
∗)− Φ(sout) ≥ λ · SW (s∗)
Proof of Corollary 12: Our proof of Theorem 11 shows that:
SW (st) ≥
1
Hn
(
λ ·OPT− µ · SW (st−1)
)
(15)
Equivalently:
SW (st)−
λ
Hn + µ
OPT ≥
µ
Hn
(
λ
Hn + µ
OPT− SW (st−1)
)
(16)
Thus either SW (st−1) ≥ λ
Hn+µ
OPT or SW (st) ≥ λ
Hn+µ
OPT. Hence, half of the time-steps have
such high social welfare, which yields the claimed bound for the empirical distribution.
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